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INTRODUCTION 
 
Our tale begins as follows: Once upon a time, in far-away lands where the 
lion and the bushbuck meet, there was a bunch of automotive component 
suppliers. A high wall fenced off their territory against foreign marauders, 
and the bunch gaily went about their business of manufacturing substandard 
parts for vehicles produced in such small batches that consumers in this 
strange nation paid among the highest prices in the world for their cars. 
One day our suppliers woke up and to their astonishment realised that the 
wall was gone. Worse, before they could finish breakfast, heavily ekwippt 
suppliers and kar assemblers schpeeking with strange akzents had taken 
over half zee nation’s territory. Word on the street was that fifth columns in 
the country had helped the outside forces prepare their assault. The future 
looked dim for our terrified and demoralized bunch! And the end goes like 
this: … and thus, our bunch lived happily ever after, sort of. 
 
The tale's missing mid-section requires some elaboration. Section 2 offers a 
brief primer on the anatomy, internal dynamics, and evolution of clusters. 
Section 3 describes the historical evolution of the Durban Automotive 
Cluster (DAC) in the context of the impact of aggressive trade liberalisation 
and expanding global automotive supply chains on the South African 
automobile industry. Section 4 is the analytical core of the chapter. It first 
presents our data and lays out our methodology. It then discusses the 
performance of the cluster over time, benchmarked against international 
competitors. Next, it develops a composite cooperation index to measure 
joint action, a key hypothesised determinant of cluster performance. Finally, 
it verifies the reasons behind the growth of the cluster through a survey of its 
members. Section 5 concludes with some remarks about the significance of 
our tale for both understanding and influencing cluster development in an 
advanced latecomer economy. 
 
A BRIEF PRIMER ON THE ANATOMY, INTERNAL DYNAMICS, 
AND EVOLUTION OF CLUSTERS 
 
How do we know a cluster when we see one? Invariably the answer to this 
question depends on the definition of the phenomenon. If any set of 
industries where buyers and suppliers interact or where participant firms 
share common technologies, buyers, or distribution channels, or where they 
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make use of the same labour pool, constitutes a cluster, the world must be 
full of them.1 If we impose the additional condition for these firms to be in 
the same location, the world-wide cluster head count is clearly lower.2 
However, what has given rise to cluster analysis, both historically and in the 
present age, is not so much the existence of inter-firm relationships or 
geographical concentration per se but rather the effects on economic 
performance these two characteristics allegedly give rise to. In short, a firm 
that can count on the ready availability of a pool of skilled labour and 
intermediate goods suppliers and that operates in an environment rife with 
new ideas – about products, technologies, or organisation – is likely to be 
more efficient than a firm located all by itself on the moon. This is true even 
in a globalised economy because much technology is so complex, specific, 
and cumulative in its development that it defies codification and 
transmission.3 Thus, when aggregating across all participant firms, the 
presence of externalities sees to it that a cluster is more than the sum of its 
parts or, more precisely, its static and dynamic efficiency is superior to what 
its participant firms would achieve outside the cluster context. 
 
Another reason commonly given for superior cluster performance is that it 
makes sense for firms in a cluster to cooperate with and to compete against 
each other more so than if they were dispersed. For example, close 
proximity allows the setting up of common training schemes. Conversely, 
the presence of local competitors spurs greater competition because 
compared to far-away producers it manifests a very visible threat.4 In 
knowledge-intensive industries, much is made of the import of inter-firm 
learning for technological upgrading and innovation. Work commissioned 
by the OECD suggests that clusters have the potential to remove the 
imperfections with respect to the production and use of knowledge inherent 
in international production networks or national innovation systems, thanks 
to the strong interdependencies between firms they create and exploit.5 
 
Similarly, in developing countries where the prevalence of small 
manufacturing firms often constitutes a hindrance to exploiting market 
opportunities, achieving economies of scale in input purchases, and 
internalising many of the functions that drive firm dynamism, networking – 
which is easier in clusters – can help firms enhance their competitiveness.6  
For example, the extent, depth, and effectiveness of the adoption of 
international best practices explain a good deal about why some firms 
manage to rise to the challenge of the southward expansion of global supply 
chains that require just-in-time (JIT) production and total quality 
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management (TQM), while others do not.  Next to the impact of relative 
integration into supply chains, it is again the interaction between the 
capabilities of firms, in addition to their response to competitive 
opportunities, that influences their growth. In short, for a number of reasons 
industrial reorganisation of developing-country firms may be more feasible 
from within a cluster.7  
 
In practical terms a firm may be able to exploit spillovers in joint ventures or 
from subsidiaries of multinational firms (MNEs) with which they are not co-
located. Hence agglomeration is not a necessary condition for externalities to 
materialise. An interesting question is what happens when the strategies of 
MNEs and local firms intersect inside a cluster that yields outcomes beyond 
those traditionally associated with host-country effects of foreign direct 
investment (FDI).8 This is an emerging field of enquiry that warrants further 
research.9 On balance, theory and empirical evidence so far suggest that it is 
very difficult to capture knowledge from an MNE without having to pay for 
it, and thus easier to assimilate and adapt information from firms in 
geographical proximity with which one is in everyday contact.10 Herein lies 
the attraction of the cluster concept both for developed and developing 
countries.  
 
But it is sometimes forgotten that agglomeration by itself is also not a 
sufficient condition to stimulate externalities. Like two grumpy old men 
sitting on a park bench without talking to each other, a cluster without 
externalities is at best an opportunity forgone, without the trappings of an 
interesting story. What would be an attractive story is seeing the two 
gentlemen all of a sudden engaged in a friendly and animated conversation, 
especially if one were able to understand what made them change their 
ways. 
 
In more formal language, the reduction of cluster dynamics to externalities – 
which by definition are involuntary and incidental – flies in the face of 
empirical evidence of what makes clusters tick the world over. The missing 
element is consciously pursued joint action mainly by firms, on occasion 
assisted by public-sector organisations and dedicated service providers. In 
other words, successful clusters develop partly because of human agency 
behind a wide range of forms of business cooperation. Put simply, 
externalities and joint action are the source of competitive advantage; 
Schmitz has termed this collective efficiency.11 
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The collective-efficiency framework helps explain the evolution of clusters. 
It makes sense to view cluster strength as the ability to respond to (adverse) 
changes in the environment, rather than as just a static attribute of however 
defined success. Clusters may have life cycles that are related to but not 
synonymous with the cycle of their key technologies. For example, 
congestion may impede further growth of a cluster literally choking on its 
own success. This then poses the problem for participant firms how to revive 
the cluster and how to avoid various kinds of potentially fatal lock-ins.12 
Similarly, technological innovation or an external shock such as an increase 
in competition induced by trade liberalisation may threaten the viability of a 
cluster unless its firms understand, and react to, the change in relative prices 
caused by either event. 
 
OECD governments generally view clusters positively, especially those that 
are highly innovative, and have created support structures aimed at 
catalyzing knowledge exchange between key cluster actors.13 But with the 
exception of dedicated science parks, networking in most existing clusters in 
advanced economies emerged more or less spontaneously. This is less 
common in developing countries. Firms shy away from the high transaction 
costs associated with identifying suitable partners, especially when supply 
relations are weak; suffer from market imperfections with respect to the 
provision of information and innovation without which clusters are unlikely 
to prosper; rarely benefit from effective sector organisations while having to 
put up with profuse lobbying activity; struggle with all kinds of decrepit 
infrastructure; and do not have the means to police free riding in the context 
of a relatively underdeveloped legal framework.14 
 
This brings to the fore external agents that reduce the weight of these factors 
and catalyze inter-firm communication. They include specialised business 
services that provide market research as well as intelligence on regulatory 
regimes, standards, product testing, and the like. They also include 
government agencies – insofar as they are technically capable and not 
principally intent on rent-seeking themselves – from local to regional and 
national level. In view of the role of governments, the interesting question is 
perhaps not so much how they can influence the creation of clusters as 
which policies promote cluster development. For example, public authorities 
might be able to address cluster deficiencies – in terms of providing physical 
or knowledge infrastructure or attracting key technologies through inward 
direct investment – that participant firms by themselves cannot solve. 
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While it is possible, in theory, to direct development policy to clusters so 
that firms capture externalities that would otherwise not be available, the 
reality of policymaking is much messier. One-size-fits-all approaches do not 
work. Successful interventions presume a thorough understanding of the 
nature of the benefits that emanate from specific instances of co-location; 
how these benefits can be married to equally idiosyncratic location-specific 
advantages; and which policy measures are best suited to making the match 
happen. 15 
 
So the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is that 
we recognise a cluster because the agglomeration of firms it represents 
exhibits at some point in time a strength that would be unattainable by the 
same firms in dispersion. This strength is due to agglomeration economies 
and to joint action, namely the concerted efforts of cluster participants to 
translate market opportunities and challenges into competitive potential by 
leveraging inter-firm cooperation. In the context of developing countries, 
this may require the involvement of public authorities or dedicated service 
providers to overcome market imperfections. While cluster is a 
geographically bounded concept, its knowledge infrastructure may well be 
open to information from beyond its boundaries. This underlines the 
potential significance of outside technology, especially in the context of 
global supply chains. Finally, clusters are a path-dependent phenomenon. 
How a cluster fares today has to do with its evolution over time and also 
bears some relevance for how it is going to perform in the future. Weak 
clusters may gain in strength, and clusters once successful may eventually 
fail. Fortunately, this chapter is inspired by a story that belongs in the former 
category. 
 
FROM IMPORT SUBSTITUTION TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: 
THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
 
The principal purpose of this section is to describe what happened, rather 
than why. A considerable body of work on clusters is guilty of giving 
extremely detailed accounts of specific instances of agglomeration without 
showing the relative weight of the multitude of variables employed to 
explain their growth. Description subsequently substitutes for analysis and 
stands in the way of theoretical understanding instead of helping to advance 
it. The historical account that follows is uncontroversial. But our contention 
that the elevation of a mere agglomeration to a vibrant cluster was critically 
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due to joint action, may well not be. That is why we construct this argument 
more carefully in Section 4. 
 
This section outlines the evolution of the South African automobile sector 
with particular emphasis on the policy environment. It shows how the 
rapidly changing competitive environment since the early 1990s impacted on 
automotive supplier firms based in the KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN). It 
examines how these firms adjusted to the changes which provides the 
context for the formation of the Durban Automotive Cluster. 
 
The South African automobile-related sector is relatively insignificant 
compared to total global automotive production but it has for many decades 
captured the attention of policy makers in the country.16  In this context 
South Africa made considerable efforts in the post-World-War-II era, 
through a variety of government interventions, to create the conditions for 
the development of a solid automobile manufacturing presence. The 
involvement of state entities in concessional financing regimes, the presence 
of subsidised state enterprises in the defence industry, the imposition of 
import quotas and tariffs, and the repression of labour unions all played their 
part in the development of a sector that supplied, almost exclusively and in a 
highly protected manner, the domestic market.  This policy regime was part 
of an industrial development framework based on import substitution that 
was central to apartheid-era economic policy.17 It was reinforced in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century as the apartheid regime began to suffer the 
effects of international isolation and sanctions and reacted with a growing 
obsession with national self-sufficiency in strategic market areas.18 
 
Automotive (and other) firms operated at levels of productivity, quality and 
innovation well below international best practice.19 For a relatively small 
passenger and commercial vehicle market there was a proliferation of 
domestically manufactured model varieties, produced and sold at costs well 
above those in more liberalised markets. In this sense South Africa up until 
the early 1990s resembled the Mexico of the 1970s. Component firms 
supplying into this market were characterised by low volumes and short-run 
production cycles. It is no wonder then that benchmarking exercises showed 
them to be some way off both competitive pricing and international 
operational standards.20 
 
The political changes of the early 1990s also heralded a new era of economic 
policies. In line with multilateral orthodoxies of the time, the country 
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embraced an accelerated trade liberalisation programme and began 
systematically to remove demand-oriented industrial policies. Within a 
relatively short period the government abolished quotas and agreed to tariff 
adjustments in the Uruguay Round of GATT. Duty levels on completely 
built up vehicles (CBUs) fell from 115 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2002 
and are scheduled to reach 25 percent by 2012. Tariffs on completely 
knocked down components (CKDs) are lower yet. However, despite an 
unambiguous commitment to trade liberalisation in general, the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) also pursued a policy agenda specific to the 
automobile sector. It did so in an effort to manage a shift towards greater 
export orientation. Policy makers did not want to run the risk of 
deindustrialisation – with disastrous effects on export prospects – that they 
knew global competition had rained on more or less unsuspecting emerging 
markets elsewhere. In 1995 this motivation led to the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP). 
 
The objective behind the initial form of the MIDP was to secure the 
investment commitment of the major original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) with an existing manufacturing presence in South Africa. The 
MIDP was largely negotiated with these key role players, and the 
government pursued it despite concerns from trading partners that it 
contravened WTO commitments. The MIDP sought to encourage the 
domestic-based OEMs to reduce the range of models produced domestically. 
To this end it allowed the OEMs to earn import credits by expanding exports 
of the reduced range of models with significant local content. Thanks to the 
so-called Import Rebate Credit Certificates (IRCCs) OEMs could thus bring 
in a fuller range of vehicles from other plants around the world for sale in 
South Africa at a reduced duty level. 
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Figure 1: Domestic OEM sales and exports by volume 
 
Source: Barnes and Johnson 2004, p. 6 
 
VW, BMW and Daimler (later DaimlerChrysler) were the first to respond by 
injecting significant capital into their South African operations for the 
production of a limited range of vehicles, the bulk of which would be 
destined for export markets. Responses by other OEMs were slower, in part 
because of more complicated ownership arrangements where international 
brands were being produced under license by domestic firms. But soon all 
major OEMs signed up. The impact of this set of arrangements on South 
African vehicle output and exports was significant (see Figure 1). Exports 
have grown substantially since 1995, and between 1998 and 2002, when 
early OEM investments had realised production potential, unit exports rose 
383.9 percent.21 Import levels have also grown under the more liberal trade 
arrangements. Imported units made up 23.1 percent of total domestic sales in 
2002 compared to 6.5 percent in 1995. 
 
The MIDP, together with the depreciation of the Rand from the mid-1990s, 
turned South Africa into a relatively competitive producer of both 
components and completed vehicles. The contribution of the auto sector to 
total manufacturing sales grew from 9.7 percent in 1994 to 12.8 percent in 
2003. Component sales during this period also grew from around R6 billion 
in 1994 to almost R15 billion in 2000. The performance of the component 
firms during the 1990s was largely driven by the MIDP. Prominent exports 
SA domestic OEM sales and exports by volume: 1995 to 2002 (as reported by NAAMSA) 
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were, for example, catalytic converters and leather seat covers.  However, 
the growth in capacity utilisation demanded by these changes and the 
increasingly stringent requirements on suppliers joining global supply chains 
placed considerable pressure on these firms. 
 
Local industry consolidated and subsidiaries of multinational component 
manufacturers entered the country. Stagnant domestic demand exacerbated 
the competitive pressure. Insofar as the initial design of the MIDP focused 
on the OEMs, the policy environment was less conducive to facilitating the 
adaptation of component firms. But subsequent adjustments to the MIDP 
addressed this shortcoming to avoid a hollowing out of the manufacturing 
base in which South Africa would merely be an assembly location. Figure 2 
shows that the rate of growth of component output increased after 1999. 
 
The overall impact of these policies was in line with expectations. 
Production for export of vehicles has increased considerably since the late 
1990s, and global OEMs expanded investments in their SA-based plants. 
However, the period has also witnessed much greater import penetration, 
with firms taking advantage of the possibility to exchange credits earned 
from exports with local content for imported models and components. 
 
Figure 2: South African automotive component output by value 
 
 
Source: Barnes and Johnson 2004, p. 8 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of automotive component firms in KZN (2004) 
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Source: Unpublished map by F. Sokolic, UKZN, B&M Analysts 
It was this changing environment that confronted firms in the KwaZulu-
Natal region. KZN is the country’s third centre in the hierarchy of 
automotive sector activity (see Figure 3). The Gauteng area around Pretoria 
and Johannesburg is both the largest market and has the largest 
concentration of OEMs (BMW, Ford, Nissan, Fiat) and component firms. 
The Eastern Cape, with its three major OEMs (DaimlerChrysler in East 
London, VW in Port Elizabeth, and Delta Motor Corporation in Uitenhage) 
is the next most significant car manufacturing centre. Production activity in 
KZN is dominated by the Toyota plant which had for many years been the 
operation with the most significant domestic output. Although many 
component firms also supplied other OEMs in the country, traditionally 
Toyota was their most important customer. The Toyota plant used a mixture 
of first tier supplies from in-house operations and local component firms, 
and imported the rest. 
 
Most automotive firms based in KZN, including Toyota, are based in or 
around Durban. Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital, hosts the second 
Durban Region: 
40 firms 
Pietermaritzburg: 
9 firms 
Richards Bay & Stanger: 
2 firms 
Ladysmith: 
1 firm 
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most numerous contingent. These firms are closely integrated with supply 
and logistics activities in Durban some 90 km away. The firms in 
Ladysmith, Stanger, and Richards Bay rely less or not at all on sourcing 
arrangements generated in Durban directly or indirectly by Toyota. Ten 
firms in KZN are first tier suppliers, 20 are second or third tier, ten supply 
the aftermarket, and a dozen more marginal firms straddle the latter 
categories (ibid, 15). Figure 4 shows their product profile. Some second and 
third tier suppliers are not exclusive auto component firms and produce for 
other sectors but count the auto sector as a significant customer. 
 
Figure 4: Profile of KZN component producers by product type 
 
 
Source: Barnes and Johnson 2004, p. 16 
 
 
The performance of these firms during the period of adjustment has been 
highly uneven. Toyota, which until early 2002 operated in South Africa 
under licence from Toyota Manufacturing Corporation of Japan, initially 
failed to respond to the changing trade environment fostered by the MIDP. 
License conditions imposed major limits on exporting and the firm 
continued to focus on producing a range of vehicles for the domestic market. 
However, in view of contracting global markets Toyota Japan sought more 
competitive platforms worldwide, and the attractive package on offer 
through the MIDP led it to take a majority stake in the Durban-based 
operations. The plants in KZN subsequently moved rapidly toward greater 
KZN automotive component manufacturing principle sub-sector
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specialisation in production and improving performance levels in order to 
secure export contracts into Toyota’s global supply system. At present 
Toyota exports the Toyota RunX to Australasia and is in the process of 
meeting requirements to export new generation Corolla and Hilux models to 
a range of markets, most notably the European Union. Toyota has also 
managed to retain a quarter of the domestic market which makes it the 
dominant assembler in South Africa. 
 
The impact of this new strategic orientation was very significant for many 
local Toyota suppliers. Delivery specifications became more onerous and 
relationships in the supply network had to move to approved systems. The 
price for non-compliance was the prospect of losing local Toyota business to 
other global suppliers. Some firms struggled to adjust, while others were 
willingly or unwillingly drawn into becoming local plants of multinational 
component firms. A number of firms that either did not supply Toyota or 
had Toyota as only one of a number of OEM customers faced a barrage of 
adjustment requirements to specialise, increase volumes of output and 
improve product and process standards. A few new entrants also appeared in 
response to the new policy environment. These included manufacturers of 
catalytic converters, seat cover manufacturers and electronics assemblers. 
 
Although most firms survived these changes, more than a handful admit to 
doing so by the barest of margins. The combined pressures that impacted on 
them, in a limited period of time, generated almost continual upheaval. It 
was in this context that studies first examined the gaps between the firms’ 
performance standards and what was to be expected of them in the future. 
Researchers from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of 
Sussex and the School of Development Studies at the then University of 
Natal (today the University of KwaZulu-Natal) investigated endogenous 
factors that affected the competitiveness of firms, using performance 
benchmarking techniques. With a combination of provincial government and 
international donor funding – notably from the UK's Department for 
International Development – the KwaZulu-Natal Industrial Restructuring 
Project (KZN IRP) initiated detailed benchmarks in sectors active in the 
region, including the automotive components sector, furniture, clothing and 
textiles. The results of the studies were presented to managers in a series of 
participatory workshops. A number of automotive components producers 
showed considerable interest. In response the research team and the firms 
made a series of applications to DTI’s new supply-side funds for financial 
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support to sustain the benchmarking work and expand the activities of the 
researchers into more active facilitation. 
 
In January 1998 the KwaZulu-Natal Benchmarking Club was formally 
constituted with participation from eleven automotive component firms, 
Toyota SA, and facilitators from the KZN IRP. The Club had as its focus the 
following activities which each member would be entitled to draw on: 
 
• confidential scheduled diagnostic reports of firm operational 
performance and customer and supplier perceptions; 
• confidential benchmarks against a similar international competitor; 
• monthly newsletters outlining aggregated benchmark findings; 
• quarterly workshops to examine generic issues and tackle specific 
problems; 
• sharing of information between the participants. 
 
Research reports that resulted from the project attracted attention from the 
metropolitan government of the Durban region. Problems of long lead times 
with DTI funding mechanisms and unwieldy bureaucratic application 
processes encouraged the KZN Benchmarking Club facilitators to explore 
links with local government officials. In 1999 the then Durban Metropolitan 
Council’s Economic Development Department, motivated by a series of 
independent research reports it had commissioned into cluster potentials 
within the automotive, chemicals and textiles sectors, agreed to provide seed 
funding towards an investigation into the potential of broadening 
participation by auto sector firms in cooperative processes. The company 
that had by then been formed to carry out the facilitation and research 
functions related to the KZN Benchmarking Club, explored the potential of 
expanding both the participation and the agenda of the Club. A series of 
workshops with KZN-based automotive components and OEM firms 
confirmed interest from over twenty firms in participating in information 
sharing and joint action activities. An additional funding commitment from 
the Durban Metropolitan Council enabled the Deputy Mayor formally to 
launch the DAC in 2002. 
 
The DAC differed in a number of ways from the KZN Benchmarking Club. 
The Club’s main activity was confidentially to benchmark each member 
firm against domestic and international competitors once a year. The Club 
also shared information of how member firms responded to the key 
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challenges arising from the benchmarks. This required a considerable 
commitment of time and resources on the part of the firms, and – insofar as 
they revealed sensitive information – could obviously only function with a 
high degree of trust amongst them. What the Club did not do was to focus on 
identifying competitive challenges facing its firms, let alone organise a 
collective response to them. By contrast, the DAC did both. Similarly to the 
Benchmarking Club, it organised for its members to share information. But 
this was no longer merely horizontal. Instead it explored opportunities for 
vertical cooperation and set up institutional arrangements to involve firms 
from various tiers of the supply chain who despite differences in size, 
experience, international exposure, and strategic orientation shared an 
interest in a functioning and growing local supplier infrastructure. 
Membership in the DAC was open to any automotive firm in KZN. Many 
DAC members also belong to the Benchmarking Club. The DAC’s 
operational structure is depicted Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Operational structure of the DAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each DAC programme is governed by a nominated Technical Steering 
Committee (TSC) to ensure the successful implementation of the business 
plans. Each TSC comprises senior managers from DAC participants, 
interested government officials and a facilitator from the cluster’s service 
provider. The four TSCs are in turn directly answerable to a DAC Executive 
comprising the four chairs of the Technical Steering Committees, three 
further automotive component manufacturer representatives including from 
an SME and a PDI- (previously disadvantaged individual) owned firm, a 
representative of each government tier providing DAC funding, a 
representative of Toyota SA and two senior facilitators from the service 
provider. 
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Crucial to the early funding of the DAC was an agreement with officials 
from the local government that a firm-driven governance structure was 
essential to secure the confidence of the participants and the sustainability of 
the initiative. Early participants voiced reservations related to their 
experiences with impractical national level cluster initiatives driven by 
government officials in conjunction with industry associations (who 
reportedly delighted in scheduling frequent meetings in Johannesburg at 
such inopportune times that no one from out of town could attend). These 
initiatives typically professed little interest in micro-level or shop-floor 
operations that firms often felt needed priority attention. While both local 
government and provincial counterparts expressed a desire for the DAC to 
take on matters such as black economic empowerment and investment 
attraction, initial funding was not made conditional on these objectives. The 
DAC Executive was in a relatively strong position in such discussions 
thanks to increasingly sourcing its own funding directly from participating 
firms and because early successes in its activities improved its credibility as 
a sound partner. Presently the DAC, having diversified its income sources 
and nurtured the maturing of its programmes areas, has begun cautiously to 
move beyond its initial focus points onto partnering with government on 
strategic initiatives such as facilitating the entrance of black owned 
components firms into the sector. 
 
It is worthwhile to reflect on the roles of the specific players that led to the 
formation of the DAC. The DAC was not a creation of direct and 
orchestrated government intervention as was the case elsewhere (for 
example the Eastern Cape Auto Cluster which was formed out of DTI 
national cluster initiatives in 1997/98). However, it would also be incorrect 
to describe the DAC as a pure ‘bottom-up’ creation of the firms that had 
originally participated in the formation of the KZN Benchmarking Club. 
Prior to the formation of the Club, most firms would have been rather 
sceptical about the benefits of interacting with either government or 
academic audiences. However, the role played by the researchers in the 
formation of the DAC ensured that contact with government – in the form of 
the DTI – was mediated. Hence government appeared a benign, if perhaps at 
times frustratingly quirky, partner. The research team, acting as facilitator, 
ensured that the more messy aspects of the interaction with the DTI did not 
impact on the day-to-day operating of the Club. It was aided in this process 
by the nature of the funding mechanism which left the recipients relatively 
free to allocate resources where they felt they would be most usefully spent. 
Integrated WP41-WEB 
10/5/2005 
The Club experience for the firms therefore left them more open to future 
engagement with government than they might have been had government 
officials got carried away with asserting their own agendas of what they 
believed were priorities for sustainable firm growth. 
 
With regard to the formation of the DAC, the Benchmarking Club 
facilitators and participating firms had been discussing for some time the 
possibility of involving additional firms and extending their activities. Their 
cautious response to local government requests for a future partnership 
showed that they felt in a position carefully to consider the merits of any 
proposal and were not solely reliant on sourcing lucrative government grants 
for their survival. While local government, and to a lesser degree its 
provincial counterparts, saw an opportunity to invest in a process that was 
already showing returns – and therefore had a good chance of future success 
– the firms saw an opportunity to reduce their risks in expanding their level 
of cooperation without the added threat of becoming dependent of, often 
fickle, government attention and support. 
 
It is also worth noting that Toyota generally took a keen interest in the 
workings and activities of the Cluster but has been very careful not to 
dominate processes. A member of its management team has been involved 
in the governance structure at the request of the other DAC members, but it 
recognised that it must not treat the DAC as its fiefdom. Many DAC 
members supply other OEMs, but with Toyota as a dominant regional 
customer they have been cautious not to rely too heavily for funding or 
operational support on the assembler. In this regard the DAC is an entity 
focused on component firms, whereas the cluster process in the Eastern 
Cape was for a long time dominated by OEMs seeking to improve 
relationships with their suppliers. Toyota participants in DAC processes 
have indicated that the projected growth in unit exports from the Durban 
plant (which will almost double output from 100 000 annually to over 180 
000) will require ongoing and perhaps more intensive relationships between 
the OEM and the DAC as time progresses. 
 
In the South African context, and perhaps on the continent more generally, 
the formation of DAC was unique. It is clear that from its origins in the early 
meetings where a handful of firms considered research of a half dozen 
academics there has been early and sustained ‘buy-in’ by the participating 
firms to the notion of networking and sharing information for individual and 
collective benefit. In its initial form as the KZN Benchmarking Club (which 
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continues to operate as a programme within the DAC) firms essentially 
managed a self-governed process. Increasing firm contributions have 
reinforced the notion of a process that firms feel they are able to direct to 
meet their own needs. Such self-reliance, combined with demonstrated 
success, has enabled the firms to negotiate the terms of funding from various 
government entities. In sum, the DAC and the BC have placed the concerns 
of the components sector at the heart of their activities instead of seeking 
primarily to serve the interests of the OEMs. 
 
The DAC process is also noteworthy for the role of its facilitators. The 
academic team and later the service company spun out of the academic 
research programme were always a neutral provider of information and 
facilitation services – the service provider has not engaged itself as a 
consultancy providing strategic or other advice to firms, other than 
benchmarks and information on sector dynamics. This enabled it to play the 
role of a trusted agent without having its agenda clouded by providing or 
needing to market specific services. Firms were thus more than usually 
willing to share information and insights. This arrangement has also kept 
overheads to a minimum for the DAC; firms are not expected to cover the 
costs of a large consulting operation or invest in elaborate value adding 
business development services as part of the deal. This has enabled broader 
participation, especially from smaller firms. 
 
Finally, government played a significant role. Although this has not always 
translated into direct participation, consistent funding with limited 
conditions has enabled the DAC to continue to expand its activities and 
involve more marginal firms. The recognition by municipal authorities that 
funding with excessively onerous conditions would limit the ability of firms 
to give direction to the process and compromise flexibility was an important 
element in the total funding-operational dynamic. By focusing on outcomes 
such as employment creation, output and export growth and improved 
sustainability of firms, especially emerging black-owned enterprises, in its 
funding mandates the municipality enabled the DAC to establish its own 
path to work towards the outcomes. A similar sensitivity to the stresses and 
strains and trust issues involved in formalising a network into an action-
oriented collective has not always been apparent from other spheres of 
government. Reduced reliance on such sources for funding was clearly 
beneficial. 
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In sum, an existing spatial agglomeration in which buyers and suppliers 
interacted and made use of the labour pool around the city of Durban but 
which historically did not exhibit the sort of strong externalities normally 
associated with successful clusters, gave rise to the benchmarking and then 
the DAC initiative. Since membership was open to any automotive firms in 
KZN regardless of their distance to Durban, the cluster was inclusive or, put 
differently, did not impose a locational requirement. In practice, it looks like 
a spatial agglomeration with a couple of relatively distant subscribers whose 
activities relate at least in part to the supply relationships in the core of the 
cluster in Durban. Neither the Benchmarking Club nor the DAC evolved 
spontaneously or even primarily as an initiative by concerned firms. Instead, 
the principal protagonists were associated with the municipal government 
and a local university. Hence, in the face of its peculiar evolution and its 
partially dispersed structure, the preliminary empirical answer to the 
theoretical question posed at the beginning of Section 2 – How do you know 
a cluster when you see one? – is that in this case its member firms chose to 
call themselves just that. This turns attention to the question of the degree to 
which this self-styled cluster generates activities that allow it to improve 
collective performance. 
 
CLUSTER PERFORMANCE AND INTER-FIRM COOPERATION 
 
Our contention is that joint action made a noticeable difference to the 
performance of those automotive suppliers in KZN that joined the DAC and 
its forerunner, the Benchmarking Club. Put differently, while the 
longstanding agglomeration of firms in KZN is likely to have given rise to 
externalities even prior to the formation of the Club and the DAC, they 
cannot account for the improvement in firm performance since the latter part 
of the 1990s. By contrast, joint action can. 
In short, this section 
• shows the improvement in operational competitiveness over time. 
Data are taken from the database of the Benchmarking Club. The Club 
evaluates members once a year against international competitors in 
both advanced and latecomer countries. This allows to gauge 
performance relatively as well as absolutely 
• makes a plausible (but refutable) case that joint action is an important 
element behind this performance. Ceteris paribus, more inter-firm 
cooperation should yield better results. The challenge is to 
operationalise this 
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• tests this contention through a survey of DAC members. Many other 
factors may be responsible, individually or jointly, for the generally 
positive performance of the DAC. Notably this would include 
increased international competition and other forms of inter- or intra-
firm cooperation, for example between license partners or subsidiaries 
and multinational principals. 
 
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IN DAC 
 
It is easy to demonstrate that member firms have become better in a range of 
activities. Indeed, firm level data confirm that operationally much has been 
happening since the late 1990s (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Average competitiveness improvements recorded at Benchmarking 
Club members 
 
Indicator Unit 1999 2002 Improvement 
(%) 
     
Total inventory holding Days 51.14 40.19 21.41 
Customer return rate Ppm 4,269 1,034 75.78 
On time & in full delivery % 91.73 92.17 0.48 
Absenteeism % 4.20 3.59 14.52 
Source: KZN/Eastern Cape/Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
Note: Total inventory holdings = ratio of operating days over stock turns per annum; 
customer return rate = parts per million units of production delivered to customers 
returned due to defects; on time and full delivery = percentage of total deliveries supplied 
to customers on time and in full; absenteeism = percentage of man days lost due to 
employees not being at work except for holiday leave. 
 
The information comprises competitiveness and financial performance data 
from over 40 automotive component manufacturers, including DAC 
members, which belong to one of three regional Benchmarking Clubs in 
KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces. In 2002, their 
employment ranged from under 50 to over 2000, and turnover from Rand 11 
million (USD 1 million) to Rand 1.1 billion (USD 11.6 million). They 
represent roughly 25 percent of the national automotive components industry 
by value. 
 
Each member is benchmarked against an international competitor based in 
either Western or Eastern Europe, Malaysia or Australia. Thus the database 
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includes information from a set of international firms that broadly match the 
product profile of their South African counterparts (see Table 2). South 
African based firms generally lag behind their competitors. Only the top 
performers match and indeed outperform their international peers. 
 
Table 2: Relative performance of Benchmarking Club members 
 
Indicator Club 
member 
average 
Club 
member 
upper 
quartile 
Developing/ 
transition 
economy 
average 
Developed 
economy 
average 
     
Total inventory 
holding 
40.19 23.00 32.81 37.30 
Customer return rate 1,034 23 529.71 785.22 
On time & in full 
delivery 
92.17 98.00 96.38 91.91 
Absenteeism 3.59 2.00 4.35 5.67 
 
Source: KZN/Eastern Cape/Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
 
THE GAINS FROM JOINT ACTION: A PLAUSIBLE BUT 
REFUTABLE CASE 
 
The indicators in Tables 1 and 2 measure how successfully DAC and other 
Benchmarking Club firms implement lean management practices.22  They do 
not show what the improvement results from. One possibility is joint action. 
The DAC runs programmes in the areas of supplier development, human 
resource development, logistics, and benchmarking to advance these 
practices. Committees staffed by managers of member firms, supported by 
facilitators from the service provider, regularly meet in order to identify 
problems, discuss how to address them, disseminate their deliberations, and 
ultimately come up with a solution. These are incidences of cooperation. In 
other words, the firms engage in joint action. 
 
In an attempt to systematise this notion we separated it into two components, 
commitment and frequency. Regarding the former, it would be different for 
managers merely to attend a workshop and (passively) absorb information as 
opposed to actively seek and provide data to share with their peers. Low 
commitment by a firm means that it underwrites the (partial) cost of an 
activity but devotes no management time to it. For example, in the DAC's 
Integrated WP41-WEB 
10/5/2005 
case the service provider surveys trends in the world car industry and 
summarises their implications for the regional automotive economy. This 
intelligence is distributed regularly to member firms. It creates awareness 
and potentially informs their strategic thinking, but firms have no direct 
input. High commitment means the investment of comprehensive 
management time across functions, such as the participation of senior staff 
in specialised work groups (e.g. on purchasing skills) that report to a 
technical steering committee which oversees the supplier development 
programme within the cluster. Frequency concerns how often activities or 
meetings take place. This goes from low (once in 5 months to once a year) to 
medium (once every 2-4 months) to high (more than once a month). 
 
In Table 3 these two parameters are combined into a composite cooperation 
index. The index weighs commitment more heavily than frequency. This is 
because a high-commitment exercise that happens once a year is worth more 
than a largely passive exercise that happens once a month. The expectation 
is that a relatively high-value joint action would lead to more solid gains. 
The last column in Table 3 illustrates that this is indeed generally the case. 
For example, in the area of supplier development, a high-powered Technical 
Steering Committee with a busy meeting schedule, assisted by a specialised 
work group, identified purchasing skills as a key weakness and ultimately 
succeeded to institute a dedicated course aimed at training the requisite skills 
at the local technical university. Likewise, joint action with a low 
cooperation score – as pretty much all activities in the DAC's Logistics 
Programme – did yield a very tangible result, namely reduced shipping rates 
for DAC members, but this was a smaller feat than re-organising the training 
programme in a school. Hence across the four cluster programmes it appears 
that a higher incidence of cooperation leads to more impressive results – it is 
plausible that joint action matters. But the case is not solid yet. 
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JOINT ACTION, COMPETITION, AND NON-CO-LOCATED 
INTER-FIRM COOPERATION 
 
Schmitz and his team based their work on collective efficiency on the 
proposition that shocks like trade liberalisation would catalyze joint 
action.23   Consequently they looked at whether or not the exchange of 
information and experiences, cooperation in improving quality and in 
speeding up delivery and so forth increased in the wake of an external shock. 
The present paper is clearly in the tradition of Schmitz's work. But in our 
case the link between trade liberalisation and inter-firm cooperation is 
obvious, as is the increase in the latter. Our question is if this increase has 
made a difference in terms of improving cluster performance. More 
formally, was the DAC instrumental in the acquisition, assimilation, 
adaptation and exploitation of information? 
 
Of course, the answer could be negative. Increased competition might have 
motivated firms to become more efficient. In this case the market matters 
most, externalities some, but joint action little to nothing. Likewise, inter-
firm cooperation may well be important but in a different sense, namely 
between license partners. In addition, knowledge transfer that ultimately 
manifests itself in more capable local adoption of lean management 
techniques may be primarily intra-firm, especially from foreign MNCs to 
their subsidiaries. Of course, global competition on the one hand and DAC 
activities on the other are different types of variables. Competition is the 
driver that propels firms to undertake (or not) some form of adjustment, and 
cluster activities are its manifestations. Joint action is unlikely in the absence 
of increased competition because there is no challenge to meet that would 
justify the required commitment of resources. At the same time, however, a 
firm can adjust primarily because of increased competition – and because it 
can draw on internal resources that allow it to do so even in the absence of 
joint action – or primarily because, given this competition, it can draw on 
collective resources. Note that especially smaller and under-resourced firms 
may not even be aware of more dynamic aspects of competition that affect 
them in the medium more so than in the short run, unless an external agency 
explains market trends to them. For this reason it makes sense to compare 
the relative weight of the rather different factors influencing firm 
adjustment. 
 
We explored the relative weight of these different variables in a survey of 
the managers of the DAC member firms (see questionnaire in Appendix). 
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The questionnaire enquires about the importance of intelligence member 
firms receive from the business service provider, the gains they get from 
participating in DAC workshops, and if members would be able to substitute 
these services if the DAC did not exist (Questions 1-7). Question 8 asks 
about the relative import of a number of variables that individually or 
collectively could conceivably influence the performance of individual 
firms. 19 of 26 targeted member firms responded. 24 
 
The results are revealing (see Table 4). On average a minimum of one in 
three managers attaches a high value to the acquisition and assimilation 
(Questions 1, 3, 4) and to the exploitation (Question 2) of knowledge made 
possible by DAC activities, and practically the entire respondent group 
assigns this at least medium significance. Interestingly, fewer managers 
benefit strategically from workshops (Question 5) than from surveys. In 
other words, external knowledge is possibly more important to dealing with 
the challenges of global supply chains than intra-cluster intelligence. The 
efficiency of joint action is not in doubt; more than nine out of ten 
respondents report that substituting cluster activities would be expensive or 
not an option at all (Question 6). Likewise, the same number of respondents 
are convinced of the effectiveness of cluster activities in generating 
performance improvements (Question 7). 
 
Table 4. Survey results (Questions 1-7): significance of learning (%) 
 
Question/importance Low Medium High 
    
1. importance of intelligence by DAC service provider for own 
understanding of global auto industry 
0 68 32 
2. importance of intelligence by DAC service provider for strategy 5 53 42 
3. importance of DAC workshops for understanding global best 
practices 
0 47 53 
4. importance of DAC workshops for understanding cluster dynamics 5 42 53 
5. importance of DAC workshops for strategy 5 74 21 
6. ease of substitutability of DAC workshops 37 58 5 
7. importance of DAC activities for improvement of operational 
competitiveness 
10 16 74 
Note: For Question 7, low = only own competitiveness; medium = only that of other 
DAC members; high = both. 
 
The latter point can be disaggregated further (see Table 5). The single most 
important factor for achieving internationally required performance 
standards is global competition. This underlines the essential role of the 
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DAC in facilitating learning about global competition reported above. In 
other words, inter-firm competition in global supply chains exerts pressure 
on firms within the cluster; and the cluster helps its members understand the 
nature of this challenge. A key factor for the ‘hard’ performance criteria of 
quality and cost is technical assistance from foreign partners; this includes 
licensors as well as multinational investors. It is in these two areas that 
South African firms are most burdened by the legacy of import substitution 
and where their competence was most in question. It appears that DAC 
activities, the joint second and third most important factor, respectively, 
helped them rise to the challenge. 
 
Table 5: Survey results (Question 8): 
Determinants of required performance levels (mean) 
 
 Quality Cost Flexibility Delivery 
     
DAC activities 4.6 4.4 4.8 4.6 
Competition from DAC members 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.5 
Competition from non-DAC suppliers in 
KZN 
2.8 2.7 2.9 3.0 
Competition from suppliers elsewhere in 
SA 
3.5 3.9 3.7 4.1 
Competition from suppliers outside SA 5.4 5.5 4.9 4.9 
Technical assistance from foreign partners 4.6 4.7 3.6 3.5 
Consultants 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.7 
     
Note: 1 = least important; 7 = most important. 
 
The situation is somewhat different with respect to the two ‘soft’ criteria of 
flexibility and delivery. In these areas cluster activities are almost as 
important as global competition while technical assistance, on average, is 
not particularly important at all. Table 3 showed that on-time and full 
delivery, especially of the Club's top performers, was on par with 
international standards. And South African firms had always had to employ 
flexibility to compensate for the cost disadvantages associated with small 
production runs. The managers' responses suggest that joint action has been 
instrumental in turning these ‘make-do’ attitudes into internationally 
acceptable competences. Small and PDI-owned firms evaluate the 
importance of joint action more positively than larger firms. On balance 
small firms say that the DAC is essential while larger firms consider it 
merely useful. 
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The information in Table 5 also shows that inside the cluster cooperation is 
more important than competition. This will be music in the ears of cluster 
aficionados. By contrast, competition is more important than inter- or intra-
firm cooperation outside the cluster. This raises the question about the 
relative significance of alliance capitalism in developing countries or, more 
specifically, the extent to which individual subsidiaries act as conduits for 
knowledge that lends itself to technological upgrading of domestic firms. It 
would be interesting to address the nature and quality of technology-relevant 
extra-cluster links in future research. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Joint action matters for firm performance, at least in the case at hand. Joint 
action lowers the costs of information provision about markets, product 
standards, process requirements, and other variables that determine the 
competence with which firms confront global value chains. Joint action also 
helps firms gear up for what is, not just in the global automotive industry, a 
tough fight for a place in the sun. Cooperation-vs-competition is a 
meaningless dichotomy. If global competition is the challenge, local 
cooperation is the efficient answer for firms that would stand little chance of 
understanding what this competition is really about, let alone facing up to 
what it asks of them. This applies to all firms in the cluster, but especially so 
to those relatively disadvantaged by small size and lack of experience in 
supplying to global value chains. 
 
The success of the DAC is due to a fortuitous combination of impartial 
analysis by academics-turned-consultants whose competence and motivation 
– unlike that of most pure-bred consultants – was beyond doubt; the 
realisation by firms of their own limitations along with a commitment to 
overcoming them; and a policy framework conducive to the strategies of 
multinational assemblers and component suppliers that incorporated South 
Africa into their worldwide production networks. 
 
It is not easy to draw lessons from this success story for the rest of Africa. 
Perhaps the key insight from this experience is that firms in latecomer – and 
even more so in developing countries – need to learn the rules of the game 
before they get a realistic chance at play. Hence knowledge is key, and 
collective efficiencies are perhaps most effective when marshaled to 
provoke, promote, and verify learning. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. Porter 1990. 
 
2. Enright 1996; Swann and Prevezer 1998. 
 
3. Storper 1997; for a useful survey of the relevant literature, see 
Baptista 1998. 
 
4. Enright 1996. 
 
5. Roelandt and den Hertog 1999. 
 
6. Ceglie et al. 1999. 
 
7. Humphrey 1995. 
 
8. Birkinshaw 1996; Young et al. 1994; Dunning 1993. 
 
9. Enright 2000. 
 
10. Blomström and Kokko 1998; Lall 1993. 
 
11. Schmitz 1999. 
 
12. Enright 1996, 207-208; Swann and Prevezer 1998. 
 
13. Roelandt and den Hertog 1999. 
 
14. Ceglie et al., 1999; for examples from Africa, see also McCormick 
1999. 
 
15. Doeringer and Terkla 1996. 
 
16. The industry comprises eight light vehicle OEMs, a number of 
medium and heavy commercial vehicle OEMs, and some 250 
dedicated component manufacturers, many of which are MNC 
subsidiaries. 
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17. Joffe et al. 1995. 
 
18. For an overview of policy in that period, see Black 2001. 
 
19. Joffe et al., 1995. 
 
20. Kaplinsky and Morris 1997. 
 
21. Data in this section are from Barnes and Johnson 2004. 
 
22. Not all DAC members are also members of the Benchmarking Club, 
and due to the relatively recent vintage of the DAC and its growing 
membership not all of those that are have been benchmarked twice, 
making it impossible to evaluate performance over time. Technically 
the correct procedure would have been for us to report performance 
indicators only for DAC firms. But this would have reduced our 
sample making it more vulnerable to outliers while not changing the 
underlying positive trend. Hence, our analysis of joint action is 
conservative in that it suggests that DAC firms are as least as good as 
Benchmarking Club members. This is not a heroic assumption. In 
future work and as our database expands both in terms of membership 
and over time, we aim to look for differences across the three 
provinces and, within KZN, between ordinary BC members and those 
that are also members of DAC. 
 
23. Schmitz 2000. 
 
24. In mid-2004 the DAC had more than forty member firms. We only 
approached those firms that have been members since the beginning 
of the Cluster in 2002 in order to elicit more informed responses. 
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DAC 
8 Old Main Road, Hillcrest, 3610 
 
PostNet Suite #10139, Private Bag X1005, Hillcrest 3650 
 
Tel: +27 (0) 31 765 3870 
 
Fax: +27 (0) 31 765 3873 
 
admin@bmanalysts.com 
 
www.dbnautocluster.org.za 
Durban Automotive Cluster  
 
DATE 
 
Attention:  
Managing Director 
 
Dear  
 
DAC PERFORMANCE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBER FIRMS 
 
Please find attached a short, two-page questionnaire that I would greatly appreciate you 
completing over the course of the next week. It is a simple questionnaire that requires the 
ticking of set responses and the provision of a few numbers. It should therefore not take 
more than 10-15 minutes to complete. Its purpose is to assess the relative significance of 
joint action in the performance improvement of cluster members. The Durban 
Automotive Cluster has been in operation now for nearly three years and as such we 
would value your input in relation to the benefits (or otherwise) derived. I would like to 
request complete honesty in relation to the completion of the questionnaire, as all 
findings will be aggregated and then used to analyse the performance of the DAC. I will 
also be using the findings to unpack some of the academic lessons that can be extracted 
from the various activities of the DAC. If you feel that you are not the most appropriate 
person to complete the questionnaire, please forward it onto the necessary individual(s).  
 
If you have any queries pertaining to the questionnaire generally, as well as individual 
questions posed, please contact me directly on 082-7875608.  
 
It would be appreciated if the questionnaire could be faxed (031-7653873) back to the 
DAC’s offices by Wednesday, the 9th of June.  
 
Kindest Regards 
 
Justin Barnes 
Chief Facilitator 
Durban Automotive Cluster 
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DAC 
Durban Automotive Cluster 
8 Old Main Road, Hillcrest, 3610 
PostNet Suite #10139, Private Bag X1005, Hillcrest 3650 
Tel: +27 (0) 31 765 3870 
Fax: +27 (0) 31 765 3873 
admin@bmanalysts.com 
www.dbnautocluster.org.za 
 
PERFORMANCE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBER FIRMS 
 
Company: 
______________________________________________________________ 
Name of respondent: 
_____________________________________________________ 
Position in company: 
_____________________________________________________ 
Date: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Do the surveys you receive from the DAC (e.g. on supplier development 
issues, human resource development, logistics and benchmarking) make a 
difference to your understanding of trends (e.g. JIT, TQM, CI) in the global 
automotive industry? 
 
No, they merely confirm what we know anyway. [  ] 
Yes, they make a small difference by complementing other sources of 
information. [  ] 
Yes, they are our single most important source of information and make a big 
difference. [  ] 
 
2. Do the insights from these surveys inform strategic thinking in your company? 
 
Not at all. [  ] 
A little. [  ] 
Very much. [  ] 
 
3. Do DAC workshops (e.g. on supplier development, HRD, logistics, general 
management issues, competitiveness issues) make a difference to your 
understanding of best practices in the global automotive industry? 
 
Not at all. [  ] 
A little. [  ] 
Very much. [  ] 
 
4. Do these workshops make a difference to your understanding of problems 
and competencies of cluster members and/or non-DAC KZN-based automotive 
suppliers? 
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No, we had an equally good understanding of the local industry even before 
these workshops. [  ] 
Yes, they contribute marginally to our understanding. [  ] 
Yes, they contribute very significantly to our understanding. [  ] 
 
5. Do discussions in these workshops inform strategic decision-making in 
your company? 
 
Not at all. [  ] 
A little. [  ] 
Very much. [  ] 
 
6. In the absence of these workshops, would you be able to get the same 
level and quality of information from other sources (such as trade magazines, 
internet sources, executive courses organized by business schools, foreign 
partners)? 
 
No. [  ] 
Yes, but only at a higher cost. [  ] 
Yes, unconditionally. [  ] 
 
7. Does your participation in activities guided by one or more of the DAC’s 
Technical Steering Committees (e.g. specialised work groups, special interest 
groups, advanced training courses) improve the operational competitiveness of 
member firms (i.e. do you learn from your peers and do they learn from you)? 
 
It does not improve my own or that of other member firms. [  ] 
It improves my own but not that of other member firms. [  ] 
It improves that of other member firms but not my own. [  ] 
It improves both. [  ] 
 
8. In terms of achieving internationally required levels of quality, cost 
competitiveness, flexibility, and speed of delivery, please rank the importance of 
the following inputs (where 7 = most important and 1 = least important) using 
the entire ranking scale from 1 to 7 for each parameter: 
 
 Quality Cost Flexibility Delivery 
DAC activities     
Competition from DAC 
members 
    
Competition from non-DAC 
suppliers based in KZN 
    
Competition from non-DAC 
suppliers based elsewhere in 
South Africa 
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Competition from suppliers 
based outside SA 
    
Technical assistance from 
foreign partners 
    
Use of consultants     
 
9. How do you feel the DAC could be improved and more effectively service 
the local auto industry? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return it via fax (031-
7653873) by Wednesday, the 9th of June 2004 
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• We are grateful to Peter Møllgard, Kaushalesh Lal, Mike Morris, and Lynn 
Mytelka for helpful suggestions. 
